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Abstrat. The tuple spae ommuniation model, suh as the one used
in Linda, provides great exibility for modeling onurrent, distributed
and mobile proesses. In a distributed setting with mobile agents, par-
tiular attention is needed for proteting sites and information. We have
designed and developed a Java middleware, Klava, for implementing
distributed tuple spaes and operations to support agent interation and
mobility. In this paper, we extend the Klava middleware with rypto-
graphi primitives that enable enryption and deryption of tuple elds.
We desribe the atual implementation of the new primitives and provide
a few examples. The proposed extension is general enough to be applied
to similar Java frameworks using multiple distributed tuples spaes pos-
sibly dealing with mobility.
1 Introdution
A suessful approah to onurrent programming is the one relying on the
Linda oordination model [10℄. Proesses ommuniate by reading and writing
tuples in a shared memory alled tuple spae. Control of aesses is guaranteed by
requiring that tuples seletion be assoiative, by means of pattern mathing. The
ommuniation model is asynhronous, anonymous, and generative, i.e., tuple's
life-time is independent of produer's life time.
The Linda model has been adopted in many ommuniation frameworks suh
as, e.g., JavaSpaes [1℄ and T Spaes [9℄, and for adding the tuple spae ommu-
niation model to existing programming languages. More reently, distributed
variants of tuple spaes have been proposed to exploit the Linda model for
programming distributed appliations over wide area networks [6, 2℄, possibly
exploiting ode mobility [7, 11℄. As shown in [8℄, where several messaging mod-
els for mobile agents are examined, the blakboard approah, of whih the tuple
spae model is a variant, is one of the most favorable and exible.
Sharing data over a wide area network suh as Internet, alls for very strong
seurity mehanisms. Computers and data are exposed to eavesdropping and
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manipulations. Dealing with these issues is even more important in the ontext
of ode mobility, where ode or agents an be moved over the dierent sites
of a net. Maliious agents ould seriously damage hosts and ompromise their
integrity, and may tamper and brainwash other agents. On the other hand,
maliious hosts may extrat sensible data from agents, hange their exeution
or modify their text [16, 12℄.
The exibility of the shared tuple spae model opens possible seurity holes;
it basially provides no aess protetion to the shared data. Indeed there is no
way to determine the issuer of an operation to the tuple spae and there is no
way to protet data: a proess may (even not intentionally) retrieve/erase data
that do not belong to it and shared data an be easily modied and orrupted.
In spite of this, within the Linda based approahes, very little attention has been
devoted to protetion and aess ontrol.
In this paper we present a Java middleware for building distributed and
mobile ode appliations interating through tuple spaes, by means of ryptog-
raphy. In this middleware, lassial Linda operations are extended for handling
enrypted data. Primitives are also supplied for enrypting and derypting tuple
ontents. This ner granularity allows mobile agents (that are not supposed to
arry private keys with them when migrating) to ollet enrypted data, while
exeuting on remote sites, and derypt them safely when bak at the home site.
The proposed extension, while targeted to our middleware for mobile agents
interating through distributed tuple spaes, Klava [3℄, is still general enough
to be applied to similar Java frameworks using multiple distributed tuples spaes
possibly dealing with mobility, suh, e.g., [11, 1, 6℄. Indeed, this extension rep-
resents a ompromise between the exibility and open nature of Linda and of
mobile ode, and the privay of data in a distributed ontext.
2 Distributed Private Generative Communiations
The Linda ommuniation model [10℄ is based on the notion of tuple spae that is
a multiset of tuples. These are just sequenes of items, alled elds that are of two
kinds: atual elds, i.e., values and identiers, and formal elds, i.e., variables.
Syntatially, a formal eld is denoted with !ide, where ide is an identier. Tuples
an be inserted in a tuple spae with the operation out and retrieved from a
tuple spae with the operations in and read (read does not withdraw the tuple
from the tuple spae). If no mathing tuple is found, both in and read blok the
proess that exeute them, until a mathing tuple beomes available. Pattern-
mathing is used to selet tuples from the tuple spae; two tuples math if they
have the same number of elds and orresponding elds do math: a formal eld
mathes any value of the same type, and two atual elds math only if they
are idential (but two formals never math). For instane, if Val is an integer
variable, then tuples (\foo"; \bar"; !Val) and (\foo"; \bar"; 300) do math. After
mathing, the variable of a formal eld gets the value of the mathed eld; in
the previous example, after mathing, Val will ontain the integer value 300.
The middleware we are presenting is based on Klava [3℄, a Java framework
implementing Klaim (Kernel Language for Agent Interation and Mobility) [7℄
that provides features for programming distributed appliations with mobile
ode and mobile agents, relying on ommuniation via multiple distributed tuple
spaes. Klaim extends Linda by handling multiple distributed tuple spaes:
tuple spaes are plaed on nodes (or sites), whih are part of a net. Eah node
ontains a tuple spae and a set of proesses, and an be aessed through its
loality. Thus, lassial Linda operations are indexed with the loality of the node
they have to be performed at. A reserved loality, self, an be used to aess
the urrent exeution site. Moreover in Klaim proesses are rst lass data, in
that they an be transmitted and exhanged among sites, so that mobile ode
and mobile agent appliations an be easily programmed.
For guaranteing privay of data stored in tuple spaes we have extended
Klava with some ryptographi primitives. In our view, this extension is a
good tradeo between the open nature of Linda (and of mobile ode) and data
privay. In partiular we aim at having this extension as smooth as possible, so
that the original model is not perverted.
The basi idea is that a tuple may ontain both lear text elds and enrypted
elds. All the enrypted elds of a spei tuple are enrypted with a single key.
This hoie simplies the overall design and does not harm usability of the
system; it would be unusual that dierent elds of the same tuple are enrypted
with dierent keys. Enrypted elds ompletely hide the enrypted ontents
that they embody: they even hide the type of the ontents. This strengthens the
serey of data (it is not even possible to know the type of sensible information).
In line with the open nature of the Linda model, our main intention is not to
prohibit proesses to retrieve data belonging to other proesses, but to guarantee
that these data be read and modied only by entitled proesses. A shared tuple
spae is basially a shared ommuniation hannel: in suh a hannel information
an be freely read and modied.
At the same time one of our aims is avoiding that wrong data be retrieved by
mistake. Clear text elds of a tuple an be used as identiers for ltering tuples
(as in the Linda philosophy), but if a mathing tuple ontains enrypted elds,
whih a proess is not able to derypt, it is also sensible that the tuple is put
bak in the tuple spae if it was withdrawn with an in. Moreover, in suh ases,
a proess may want to try to retrieve another mathing tuple, possibly until the
right one is retrieved (i.e., a tuple for whih it has the appropriate deryption
key), and to be bloked until one is available, in ase no suh tuple is found.
Within our framework it is possible to
{ use tuple elds with enrypted data;
{ enrypt tuple elds with spei keys;
{ derypt a tuple with enrypted elds;
{ use variants of the operations in and read (ink and readk) to atomially
retrieve a tuple and derypt its ontents.
The modied versions of the retrieving operations, ink and readk, are based
on the following proedure:
1. look for and possibly retrieve a mathing tuple,
2. attempt a deryption of the enrypted elds of the retrieved tuple
3. if the deryption fails:
(a) if the operation was an ink then put the retrieved tuple bak in the tuple
spae,
(b) look for alternative mathing tuples,
4. if all these attempts fail, then blok until another mathing tuple is available.
Thus the programmer is relieved from the burden of exeuting all these internal
tasks, and when a readk or an ink operation sueeds it is guaranteed that the
retrieved tuple has been orretly derypted. Basially the original Linda pattern
mathing mehanism is not modied: enrypted elds are seen as ordinary elds
that have type KCipher (as shown in Setion 3). It an be seen as an extended
pattern mathing mehanism that, after the strutural mathing, also attempts
to derypt enrypted elds.
In ase mobile ode is used, the above approah may be unsafe. Indeed,
symmetri and asymmetri key enryption tehniques rely on the serey of the
key (in asymmetri enryption the private key must be kept seret). Thus, a
fundamental requirement is that mobile ode and mobile agents must not arry
private keys when migrating to a remote site (\Software agents have no hopes
of keeping ryptographi keys seret in a realisti, eÆient setting" [16℄). This
implies that the above introdued operations ink and readk annot be used by
a mobile agent exeuting on a remote site, beause they would require arrying
over a key for deryption.
For mobile agents it is then neessary to supply a ner grain retrieval meh-
anism. For this reason we introdued also operations for the expliit deryption
of tuples: a tuple, ontaining enrypted elds, will be retrieved by a mobile agent
by means of standard in and read operations and no automati deryption will
be attempted. The atual deryption of the retrieved tuples an take plae when
the agent is exeuting at the home site, where the key for deryption is available
and an be safely used. Typially a mobile agent system onsists of stationary
agents, that do not migrate, and mobile agents that visit other sites in the net-
work, and, upon arrival at the home site, an ommuniate with the stationary
agents.
Thus the basi idea is that mobile agents ollet enrypted data at remote
sites and ommuniate these data to the stationary agents, whih an safely
derypt their ontents. Obviously, if some data are retrieved by mistake, it is up
to the agents to put it bak on the site from where they were withdrawn. This
restrition of the protool for fething tuples is neessary if one wants to avoid
running the risk of leaking private keys. On the ontrary, publi keys an be
safely transported and ommuniated. By using publi keys mobile agents are
able to enrypt the data olleted along their itinerary.
Notie that there is no guarantee that a \wrong" tuple is put bak: our
framework addresses privay, not seurity, i.e., even if data an be stolen, still
it annot be read. Should this be not aeptable, one should resort to a seure
hannel-based ommuniation model, and give up the Linda shared tuple spae
model. Indeed the funtionalities of our framework are similar to the one pro-
vided, e.g., by PGP [17℄ that does not avoid e-mails be eavesdropped and stolen,
but their ontents are still private sine they are unreadable for those that do
not own the right deryption key.
An alternative approah ould be that of physially removing an enrypted
tuple, retrieved with an in, only when the home site of the agent that performed
the in, noties that the deryption has taken plae suessfully. Suh a tuple
would be restored if the deryption is aknowledged to have failed or after a
spei timeout expired. However, this approah makes a tuple's life time de-
pendent on that of a mobile agent, whih, by its own nature, is independent
and autonomous: agents would be expeted to aomplish their task within a
spei amount of time. Moreover, inonsistenies ould arise in ase suessful
deryption aknowledgments arrive after the timeout has expired.
3 Implementation
Klava [3℄ is deployed as an extensible Java pakage, Klava, that denes the
lasses and the run-time system for developing distributed and mobile ode ap-
pliations aording to the programming model of Klaim. In Klava proesses
are instanes of sublasses of lass KlavaProess and an use methods for a-
essing a tuple spae of a node: out(t,l), for inserting the tuple t into the
tuple spae of the node at loality l, read(t,l) and in(t,l), for, respetively,
reading and withdrawing a tuple mathing with t from the tuple spae of the
node at loality l. Moreover the method eval(P,l) an be used for spawning
a KlavaProess P for remote exeution on site l. Some wrapper lasses are
supplied for tuple elds suh as KString, KInteger, et.
The extension of this pakage, CryptoKlava, provides the ryptography
features desribed in the previous setion. We have used the Java Cryptogra-
phy Extension (JCE ) [13℄, a set of pakages that provide a framework and im-
plementations for enryption, key generation and key agreement, and Message
Authentiation Code (MAC) algorithms. JCE denes a set of standard API,
so that dierent ryptography algorithms an be plugged into a system or an
appliation, without modifying the existing ode. Keys and ertiates an be
safely stored in a Keystore, an enrypted arhive.
CryptoKlava is implemented as a subpakage of the pakage Klava, namely
Klava.rypto, so that it is self-ontained and does not aet the main pak-
age. In the rest of this setion we will desribe the main lasses of the pakage
Klava.rypto, implementing ryptographi features.
The lass KCipher is introdued in order to handle formal and atual elds
ontaining enrypted data (it follows theKlava onvention that wrapper lasses
for tuple items start with a K). Basially it an be seen as a wrapper for standard
Klava tuple elds. This lass inludes the following elds:
proteted byte[℄ enItem; // enrypted data
proteted Objet ref; // referene to the real tuple item
proteted String alg; // en de algorithm type
The referene ref will be null when the eld is a formal eld, or the eld
has not yet been derypted. After retrieving a mathing tuple, enItem will
ontain the enrypted data (that is always stored and manipulated as an array
of bytes). After the deryption, ref will refer to the derypted data. Conversely,
upon reation of an atual eld, ref will ontain the data to be enrypted; after
enryption, enItem will ontain the enrypted data, while ref will be set to
null (so that the garbage olletor an eventually erase suh lear data also from
the memory). alg stores information about the algorithm used for enryption
and deryption.
An atual enrypted tuple eld an be reated by rstly reating a standard
Klava tuple eld (in the example a string) and then by passing suh eld to an
instane of lass KCipher:
KString s = new KString("foo");
KCipher ks = new KCipher(s);
Similarly the following ode reates an enrypted string formal tuple eld (In
Klava a formal eld is reated by instantiating an objet from a Klava lass for
tuple elds { suh as KString, KInteger, et. { through the default onstrutor):
KString s = new KString();
KCipher ks = new KCipher(s);
KCipher supplies methods en and de for respetively enrypting and de-
rypting data represented by the tuple eld. These methods reeive, as param-
eter, the Key that has to be used for enryption and deryption, and en also
aepts the speiation of the algorithm. These methods an be invoked only
by the lasses of the pakage.
The lass Tuplex extends the standard Klava lass Tuple, in order to on-
tain elds of lass KCipher, besides standard tuple elds; apart from provid-
ing methods for ryptographi primitives, it also serves as a rst lter during
mathing: it will avoid that ordinary tuples (ontaining only lear text data)
be mathed with enrypted tuples. One tuple elds are inserted into a Tuplex
objet, the KCipher elds an be enrypted by means of the method enode.
For instane, the following ode
KString ps = new KString("lear");
KCipher ks = new KCipher(new KString("seret"));
Tuplex t = new Tuplex();
t.add(ps); t.add(ks);
t.enode();
reates a tuple where the rst eld is a lear text string, and the seond is a
eld to be enrypted, and then atually enrypts the KCipher eld by alling
enode. Also enode an reeive parameters speifying the key and the algorithm
for the enryption; otherwise the default values are used. enode basially alls
the previously desribed method en on every KCipher tuple eld, thus ensuring
that all enrypted elds within a tuple rely on the same key and algorithm.
As for the retrieval operation, this an be performed either with the new
introdued operations, ink and readk, if they are exeuted on the loal site
KString s = new KString();
KString se = new KString();
KCipher ks = new KCipher(se);
Tuplex t = new Tuplex();
t.add(s); t.add(ks);
ink(t, l);
Print("enrypted data is: " + se);
or by rst retrieving the tuple and then manually deoding enrypted elds:
... // as above
in(t, l);
...
t.deode();
Print("enrypted data is: " + se);
Notie that in both ases referenes ontained in an enrypted eld (suh as se)
are automatially updated during the deryption. The ink in the former example
is performed at a remote site but this does not mean that the key travels in the
net: as explained in the previous setion, the mathing mehanism is impliitly
split into a retrieve phase (whih takes plae remotely) and a deryption phase
(whih takes plae loally).
Operations ink and readk are provided as methods in the lass Klava-
Proessx, whih extends the lass KlavaProess for standard proesses. Klava-
Proessx also keeps information about the KeyStore of the proess and the
default keys to be used for enryption and deryption. Obviously these elds
are transient so that they are not delivered together with the proess, should
it migrate to a remote site. All these extended lasses make the extension of
Klava ompletely modular: no modiation was made to the original Klava
lasses.
Finally, let us observe that, thanks to abstrations provided by the JCE, all
the introdued operations are independent of the spei ryptography meha-
nism, so both symmetri and asymmetri enryption shemes an be employed.
4 An Enrypted Chat System
The hat system we present in this setion is simplied, but it implements the
basi features that are ommon to several real hat systems. The system onsists
of a ChatServer and many ChatClients and it is a variant of the one presented
in [3℄ with the new ryptographi primitives. When a lient sends a message,
the server has to deliver the message to all onneted lients. If a message is
\private", it will be delivered only to the lients speied in the list sent along
with the message.
Messages are normally delivered through the network as lear text, so they
an be read by everyone:
{ an eavesdropper an interept the messages and read their ontents;
{ a misbehaving hat server an examine lients' messages.
Moreover, the messages might also be modied so that a lient believes he is
reeiving messages from another lient, while it would be reading messages forged
by a \man in the middle".
While this is normally aeptable, due to the open nature of a hat system,
nonetheless there ould be situations when the privay and integrity of messages
is a major onern; for instane if two lients want to engage a private ommu-
niation. This is a typial senario where ryptography an solve the problem of
privay (through enryption).
In this example we implement a hat server and a hat lient, apable of
handling private enrypted messages:
{ when the lient wants to send a private message to a spei reeiver, it
enrypts the body of the message with a key;
{ the server reeives the message and simply forwards it to the reeiver;
{ the reeiver will reeive the message with the enrypted body and it an
derypt it with the appropriate key.
Notie that lients that want to ommuniate privately must have agreed about
the spei key to be used during the private message exhange; this is denitely
the ase with symmetri keys. As for publi and private key enryption the
reeiver an simply use its private key, to derypt a message enrypted with its
own publi key.
A private message is represented by a tuple with the following format:
("PERSONAL", <body>, <reipient>, <sender>)
where <reipient> and <sender> are, respetively, the loality of the lient the
message is destined to and the loality of the issuer of the message. Basially,
when a lient wants to send a message with an enrypted body, it will have to
perform the following steps:
Tuplex t = new Tuplex() ;
KCipher ryptMessage = new KCipher( message ) ;
t.add( new KString( "PERSONAL" ) );
t.add( ryptMessage ) ;
t.add( seletedUser ) ;
t.add( self ) ;
t.enode();
out( t, server ) ;
where message is the atual message body.
The server handles enrypted messages by retrieving them through the fol-
lowing ations (it will deliver the tuple without the eld <reipient>, whih is
useless at this time):
KString message = new KString() ;
KCipher ryptMessage = new KCipher( message ) ;
Loality to = new PhysialLoality() ;
Loality from = new PhysialLoality() ;
Tuplex t = new Tuplex() ;
t.add( new KString( "PERSONAL" ) );
t.add( ryptMessage ) ;
t.add( to ) ;
t.add( from ) ;
in( t, self ) ;
and it delivers the message to the reipient as follows:
out( new Tuplex(new KString ("PERSONAL"), ryptMessage, from), to );
On the other hand, the reeiver, whih is always waiting for inoming mes-
sages, will read and derypt a message (in one atomi step), by means of the
operation ink:
KString message = new KString() ;
KCipher ryptMessage = new KCipher( message ) ;
KString from = new KString() ;
Tuplex t = new Tuplex() ;
t.add( new KString( "PERSONAL" ) ) ;
t.add( ryptMessage ) ;
t.add( from ) ;
ink( t, self ) ;
Print("Reeived message: " + message);
Both the server and the lients exeute these operations within the loop for
handling inoming messages.
5 Conlusions and Related Work
Sine tuple spae operations an be used both by loal proesses and by mo-
bile agents, the extended operations, presented in this paper, address both the
privay of hosts and of mobile agents. We did not deal with key distribution
expliitly that an be seen as an orthogonal problem. Digital signatures an
be smoothly integrated in our framework and the pattern mathing extended
aordingly.
The work that is loser to ours is [4℄, whih introdues the Seure Objet Spae
(SeOS) model. This model is intended to extend Linda with ne-grained a-
ess ontrol semantis. In SeOS all tuple elds are loked with a key, and eah
eld must be loked with a dierent key. The basi idea is that a proess, upon
retrieving a tuple, an see only the elds for whih he owns the orresponding
key. The struture of a tuple does not inuene pattern mathing: due to an in-
trodued subsumption rule, a template an math also a bigger tuple, and elds
an be reordered during the mathing. [5℄ proposes a similar, but riher frame-
work, SeSpaes, where also resoure aess ontrol and tuple spae partitioning
failities are provided (orthogonal and omplementary to our approah).
All these features tend to alter the original Linda model, while our prinipal
aim is to provide an extension of the Linda ommuniation model that an be
smoothly integrated into the existing features, without signiantly hanging the
original model. Moreover, neither SeOS nor SeSpaes handle ode mobility,
whih is one of our main onerns.
Mobility imposes additional restritions on the underlying model, e.g., re-
quiring that agents do not arry private keys during migrations, and alls for
alternatives suh as expliit enryption and deryption mehanisms and a two-
stage pattern mathing. Indeed the problem of proteting an agent against a
maliious host is even more ompliated than that of proteting a host from a
maliious agent (we refer to the papers in [14, 15℄).
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